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LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY BLASTING, OR BY AccI-
DENTAL EXPLOSIONS OF DYNAmITE OR GUNPOWDER.. WHEN DE-
PENDENT UPON NEGLIGENCE. UTSE BY INDEPENDENT CONTEAC-
TORS.-Ftzsimons & Connell Co. V. Braun et al., Supreme Court
of Illinois, October 25, 1902. Appeal from Appellate Court (94
Ill. App. 533), affirming a judgment for plaintiffs.
This was an action for injuries to a building of the plaintiff,
caused by the use of dynamite by the defendant, a contractor, in
excavating a tunnel for the city of Chicago. The tunnel was in-
tended for the use of the city in supplying the inhabitants thereof
with water. The tunnel passed within a few feet of the corner
of the plaintiff's building, about eighty feet beneath the surface
of the ground. The evidence showed that the injury was caused
by the concussion of the earth, upon which the plaintiff's build-
ing stood, and of the air, causing it to shake and vibrate, and
NOTES.
causing its walls to crack. The contract between the city and the
contractor forbade the use of explosives except where the excava-
tion was in rock, but the evidence showed that the excavation at
the time of the explosions in question was not in rock, but in
indurated clay, with some gravel and bowlders embedded in it.
It was also shown that the excavation through the clay and gfavel
might have been effected without the use of explosives, though it
could be more cheaply done with the aid of dynamite. Thus the
defendants' use of dynamite at the time of the explosion in
question was unnecessary and unlawful, being done in excess
of the terms of the contract under which they were work-
ing. It can hardly be doubted that had the court allowed the
liability of the defendant to be decided on the question of negli-
gence, there was ample proof to have established the liability on
that ground. But the court took a firm stand, refusing to allow
it to be decided on that ground, and instructed the jury in sub-
stance, that one who makes use of an explosive in the ground
near the property of another, when the natural and probable,
though not the inevitable, result of the explosion is injury to
such property of the other, is liable for the resulting injury,
however high a degree of care or skill may have been exercised
in making use of the explosive. This ruling was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The ground of this decision is that the work of excavating the
tunnel underneath the buildings of a populous city with dyna-
mite was intrinsically dangerous, no matter how carefully and
skillfully the explosions were conducted and that the intrinsic
danger of the use of dynamite being a matter of common knowl-
edge, the courts will take judicial notice of it. In other words,
they put it on the ground of a nuisance and hold the perpetrator
thereof absolutely liable for injuries resulting from it.
They comment on the distinctions made in some courts in
cases where injuries have resulted from the use of explosives in
the execution of public works and of works authorized by law;
where there has been no physical invasion of the property of the
plaintiff, and the injury has occurred merely by the concussion
of the earth or air. They say, however, there are no such dis-
tinctions recognized in Illinois.
The principal authorities on which the principal case is de-
cided are Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110, 1877, 29 Am. Rep. 17,
and Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 60
Ohio St. 580, 1900. In the former case it appeared that it was
necessary, in the construction of a public work, that blasting of
rocks should be done in a public street of the city. The con-
tractor used all due care, skill and caution in performing the
work of blasting. A stone was thrown by the blast against a
building of the plaintiff and injury was thereby caused. Judg-
ment for the plaintiff. The latter case of Bradford Glycenne
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Go. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co. (supra), the Court in the
principle case cites as authority for the view that liability in
such cases is not restricted to an actual invasion of the property,
but damages for injury resulting from concussion or vibration
caused by an explosive (i. a., consequential injury), may be re-
covered. In this case, an explosion of nitro-glycerine, stored
in the defendant's magazine, which occurred in spite of the
exercise of due care, injured the plaintiff's building, distant more
than a mile. The plaintiff was allowed to recover. In taking
these two cases together as authority for the principal case, the
court puts the keeping of dangerous explosives and the inten-
tional explosions, i. e., blasting, when they result in injury, on
the same basis.
One other Illinois case is in point :-Laflin and Rand Powder
Company v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322, 1890. This was an action for
damage resulting from an explosion of a powder magazine upon
the premises of the defendant. Held, that the keeping of the
magazine upon defendant's own premises, so situated with refer-
ence to the dwelling house of the plaintiff that it was liable to
inflict serious injury upon her person or her property in case
of an explosion, was a private nuisance. Therefore the defend-
ant was liable whether the powder was carefully kept or not.
Cases of injuries resulting from explosions of dangerous sub-
stances may be divided into two classes: first, those which occur
through negligence of the user, and second, those which occur
without negligence-of the user. In the first class, the right of the
person injured to recover is, in general, absolute. In the second
class, the decisions are not uniform, some states allowing recov-
ery without reference to negligence and others allowing certain
causes to defeat recovery.
The following causes have, in some states, prevented recovery:
1. That the injury occurred in the lawful execution of a work
authorized by law. This authorization may be equivalent to a
command, as where a municipal corporation is by act of legis-
lature required to lay out a street or construct a sewer; or it may
be merely a privilege, as where a railroad is authorized to con-
struct its roadbed.
2. That the use of the explosives was not, under all the sur-
roundings and circumstances obviously dangerous, i. e., not a
nuisance.. 3. That the injury was the result of the concussion of the
earth or air, and not the result of throwing a substance onto the
person or premises of the plaintiff, i. e., not a physical invasion
or trespass.
The following are the principal decisions on these points ar-
ranged by states:
AL . Kinney v. Koopman & Gerdes, 116 Ala. 310, 1896,
and Rudder v. Koopman & Gerdes, 116 Ala. 332, 1896. Held,
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that storing gunpowder or dynamite in large quantities near the
-dwelling houses of citizens in a thickly settled portion of a town
.and near a public street, is not a nuisance per se, and negligence
must be shown. But storing them in a wooden building within
the limits of a town, in a thickly settled portion of it, and in
proximity to many buildings, constitutes a nuisance, rendering
the owner liable for injuries from an explosion without proof of
negligence: Collins v. Alabama Great Southern By. Co., 104 Ala.
390, 1893.
CAiFoRNiA. Colton v. Onderdonk, 68 Cal. 155, 1886. Held,
that where the owner of a lot situated in a large city and contigu-
ous to the dwelling house of another, uses gunpowder to blast
out rocks on his lot, he is liable for damage done to the house of
an adjoining owner, whether caused by rocks thrown against the
house or by a concussion of the air.
Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 1895. Defendant
was engaged in the manufacture of dynamite. Held, that in
the ordinary course of things an explosion does not occur in such
nanufacture, if proper care is used. But proof of the explosion
raises prima facie a presumption of negligence, and places the
burden upon defendant to overcome it: Munro v. P. C. D. & B.
Co., 84 Cal. 515, 1890.
CONNECTICUT. Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Borough of Norwalk,
63 Conn. 495, 1893. Action to recover damages to plaintif's gas
pipes, caused by blasting on the part of the defendant municipal
corporation, in the construction of a sewer in its streets. The
construction was done by contractors under contract with the
defendant. It was held that the defendant's liability was de-
-pendent upon the negligent performance of the work, since a
-duty was imposed upon it to open streets and lay and maintain
sewers therein. The liability or the exemption from liability of
a municipal corporation is the same whether the particular work
is constructed under a special privilege granted at the request
of the corporation, or in the performance of a public and gov-
ernmental duty, the question being whether or not there was
negligence in the manner of performing the work. The adop-
tion of a general public sewer system, etc., by a municipal cor-
poration are considered as judicial acts.
DE.wA x. Mills v. Railway Co., 1 Marv. 269, 1894. Action
-for damages for personal injuries to plaintiff while traveling
upon the public highway, caused by a rock hurled against him
from blasting done by the defendant company. The defendant
was lawfully engaged in blasting 7or the purpose of improving
the road under the authority of its charter. Held, that blasting
on a public highway is in itself dangerous and great care must
be used. But the defendant is not liable unless the injury was
caused by its negligence, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to
prove negligence.
NOTES.
ILLiNoIs. Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110, 1877 (supra); Fitz-
simons & Connell Co. v. Braun et al., 65 N. E. Rep. 249, 1902
(supra); Laflin & Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 131 Ill. 322,
1890 (supra).
IwNr&NA. Wright et al. v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337, 1876. De-
fendant was held liable, without regard to negligence, for injuries
to plaintiff caused by a blast of gunpowder in defendant's quarry
by which fragments were thrown against plaintiff on the high-
way.
MASSACHUSETTS. Dodge v. County Commissioners of Essex, 3
Met. 380, 1841. Plaintiffs were owners of a lot and house situ-
ated near a railroad, which railroad was near a ledge of rock.
The company, by the necessary operation of blasting said ledge
of rock for the purpose of grading their railroad, greatly dam-
aged and nearly destroyed the petitioner's house. By statute it
was provided that, "every railroad corporation shall be liable to
pay all damages, that shall be occasioned by laying out, and
making and maintaining their road, or by taking any land or
materials, etc." Held, that under this statute the plaintiff was
entitled to have damages assessed; but that an action of tort
would not lie unless damages were occasioned by carelessness or
negligence in executing the work. An authority to construct any
public work carries with it an authority to use the appropriate
means; and, if due precautions are taken to prevent unnecessary
damage, blasting is a justifiable and appropriate means. Neces-
sary damage occasioned thereby to a dwelling house is one of the
natural consequences of executing the work and within the
statute.
Murphy v. Lowell, 128 Mass. ,396, 1880. Action for per-
sonal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by a stone which
was thrown against her from a blast exploded in the con-
struction of a sewer by the defendant municipal corporation.
Held, that a city having the legal right to construct sewers in its
streets, is not liable in tort for all damages that may be caused
by the blasting of rocks, necessary in such construction; but only
for such damages as are occasioned by the carelessness or unskill-
fulness of its agents in doing the work: Brown v. P. W. & B. R.
R. Co., 5 Gray 35, 1855; Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564,
1876; Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 1891; Deane v. Ran-
dolph, 132 Mass. 475, 1882; White v. Medford, 163 Mass. 164,
1895.
NEw J.RSEY. McAndrews v. Collerd, 42 N. J. TL. 189, 1880.
The D. Li. & W. Railroad Company having legislative authority
to construct a tunnel, contracted with M., the defendant (plain-
tiff in error) to do the work. Plaintiff's houses were injured
by the explosion of a powder magazine constructed by defendant
within the limits of Jersey City, and 1,200 feet from the houses.
Held, that, as the keeping of explosives in large quantities in the
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vicinity of a dwelling house is a nuisance per se, being contrary
to statute, the defendant is liable, though no negligence in exe-
cuting the work is proved and even though it is proved that the
work has been done in the most careful manner. That the prop-
osition of the defendant that, inasmuch as the explosive materials
were necessary to the work and the work was done pursuant to
legislative authority, in such legislative authority to do the
work was included the authority to store with impunity in a
convenient place, so much explosive as might be necessary for
the convenient prosecution of the work, could not be sustained.
That the charge of the court to the jury that nothing but the
most imperious and absolute necessity would justify such a con-
clusion, was, to say the least, quite as favorable to the defend-
ant as it ought to have been. That the distinction must be
drawn, between the non-liability of public agents, in the con-
struction, within their limitations, of public works and the lia-
bility of private corporations authorized by the legislature to
construct and operate works for their own emolument, though
for public advantage.
Simon et al. v. Henry et al., 41 Atl. Rep. 692, 1898. The
defendants, having contracted with municipal authorities to
construct a public sewer in a street, used dynamite to blast
out trap rock in making the necessary trench. Held, that if the
defendants exercised reasonable care and skill in the use of the
explosive, they were not responsible for damage done to plain-
tiff's buildings on the side of the street caused by the concussion
resulting from the blasts. The court distinguished this case
from MoAndrews v. Collerd (supra), in that, in that case there
was a nuisance, while in this there was none. The nuisance in
McAndrews v. Collerd consisted, not in the use of explosives, but
in the maintenance of a magazine where a large quantity was
stored. The court, in this case, said that blasting of rock by
dynamite in the construction of a public sewer through a high-
way could not be per se a nuisance. That it was the only practic-
able mode of removing the rock, that it was often used in such
work, and that the skillful use of these explosives involves no
more danger than the use of various other forces which science
has discovered, and which, in their general effect, promote the
convenience and progress of society and are therefore recognized
as lawful agencies: Tinsman v. B. D. B. R. Co., 2 Dutcher 148,
1859; Cuff v. N. & N. Y. R. B. Co., 6 Vroom, 17 1870.
Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill 292, 1844. Held, that keeping a
large quantity of powder in an insufficiently secured wooden
building is a public nuisance, and the owner is liable for injuries
from an explosion though he is not negligent.
Intentional Explosions. a. Where the injury results from
something being thrown against person or property, i. e., direct
injury.
XOTES.
NEw YORK. Unintentional Explosions. Heeg v. Licht, 80
N. Y. 579, 1880. Defendant constructed a powder magazine
.upon his premises, with the usual safeguards, in which he kept a
-quantity of powder; this, without any apparent cause, exploded,
injuring plaintiff's house upon adjoining premises. Held, that
-the fact that the explosion took place under the circumstances,
tended to establish that damage was liable to be caused in the
. vicinity, although guarded with care. This itself in some locali-
-ties would render it a private nuisance and it was a question for
the jury to determine whether from its dangerous character, its
-proximity to other buildings, etc., it was in fact a nuisance. If
-so, the defendant is liable for injuries whether negligent or not.
In accordance with Heeg v. Licht, with practically the same facts,
is Lounsbury v. Foss, 80 Hun 296, 1894.
Hays v. The Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159, 1849. Defendants, a
-corporation, dug a canal upon their own land for purposes au-
thorized by their charter. In so doing it was necessary to blast
rocks with gunpowder, and the fragments were thrown against
and injured plaintiff's dwelling upon lands adjoining. Held,
defendants were liable though no negligence was shown: Tre-
main v. Cohoes Go., 2 N. Y. 163, 1849.
St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N. Y. 416, 1874. The facts in this
ease were similar to Hays v. Cohoes (supra), except that the
defendant was a contractor with the state, and the injury was to
plaintiff's person. The blasting which caused the injury was
-necessary and the work was done without negligence. The de-
fendant was held liable on the ground that throwing earth upon
laintiff's land and person was a trespass.
Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, 1900. In this case the
-same principle of liability regardless of negligence, was applied,
-where the plaintiff was hit by a piece of wood from a blast while
traveling on the public highway.. Intentional Explosions. b. Where the injury results from a
-concussion, i. e., consequential injury.
Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N. Y. 156, 1892. De-
fendant, while engaged under contract with the United States
-government, in the work of removing rocks in New-York harbor,
in blasting, injured plaintiff's house, 3,000 feet away. The blast-
ing was necessary to carry out the contract. The injury was
.caused by the concussion of the earth and air. The defend-
ants were held not liable on the ground that they had the author-
ity to do what must necessarily result in the injury.
Booth v. The Rome, Watertown & Ogdensburg Terminal
Railroad Co., 140 N. Y. 267, 1893. The defendant corpora-
tion was obliged to resort to blasting in order to make excava-
tions on its land. It was authorized by legislature to put its
land into proper shape to fit it for its business. In the absence
.of negligence in the manner of doing the work, the defendant
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was held not liable for injuries to a house on adjoining land,
where that injury was caused by the concussion of the ground
and air. This decision was on the ground that the work was
lawful and the injury consequential. There was no .technical
trespass to found an action upon: French Y. Viz, 143 N. Y. 90,
1894.
Holland House Co. v. Baird, 169 IN. Y. 136, 1901. Defendant
was engaged in excavating a trench in the street in front of
plaintiff's building under a municipal contract. Plaintiffs buila-
mng was injured by the concussion of the earth from blasting
which the defendant did, without negligence, in accordance with
the contract and in conformity with the city ordinances. Held,
that the defendant was not liable. The court said, "The rule of
law must be considered as well settled in this court that negli-
gence is essential to be proved in such a case as this of conse-
quential injury, in order to create any liability in the defendant.
. . . That a vibration of the earth, or of the atmosphere, is the
invariable accompaniment of an explosion, is a fact of universal
observation, or knowledge, and to make that a source of liability,
which may be an ordinary result of a lawful work, requires that
it shall be made to appear that the explosion was unnecessarily
violent and carelessly prepared for, having regard to the place
and surroundings."
NORTH CARoLriA. Blackwell v. Railroad, 111 N. C. 151,
1892. Contractors were engaged in construction of the roadbed
of defendant company. While blasting in a cut 200 yards from
the residence of plaintiff's intestate, a stone was thrown against
intestate, who was engaged in some of his ordinary occupations-
in the yard close to his dwelling and killed him. The railroad
company had acquired a right of way for its roadbed from in--
testate, but it did not embrace the land where the killing occur-
red. Held, that if damage resulted from the careless method in
which the work was done, or if the material adopted as an ex-
plosive was unnecessarily powerful, the defendant was liable;
that it was properly left to the jury to determine the fact of
negligence.
Omuo. Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Go.,
60 Ohio St. 560 (supra), 1900; Tiflin v. McCormack et al., 34
Ohio St. 638, 1878.
P.ENsYLviA. The cases in Pennsylvania on this subject
are nearly all cases in equity for injunction to restrain defend-
ants from keeping and using explosives on the ground of nui-
sance. In those cases where the keeping and using of explosives
have been held to be nuisances and restrained in equity, we may
assume that, had they resulted in injury to the person or prop-
erty of the plaintiffs, the defendants would have been held liable
at law.
Sayen v. Johnson & Bro., 4 Pa. C. 0. 360, 1885. An in-
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junction was granted to restrain a defendant from so operat-
ing a stone quarry by blasting, etc., that pieces of rock were
constantly thrown into the public road and upon the premises
of the plaintiff, to the great danger of the plaintiff and hie
family.
Payne v. McGranor, 49 Pitts. L. J. 96, 1901; McDonough v.
Roat, 8 Kulp, 433, 1897. Held, the business of storing and
handling of dynamite, does or does not constitute a nuisance,
according to the locality and surroundings in which it is carried
on. It was restrained in this case as a nuisance, it being kept
in a hardware store, -located in a thickly settled portion of a
borough, when neither public necessity nor the defendant's busi-
ness exigencies required that such material should be there kept:
Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230, 1873; Dilworth's Appeal, 91 Pa.
247, 1879; Daw v. Enterprise Powder Mfg. Co., 160 Pa. 479,
1894.
Action for Damages at Law. Tuckachinsy v. Lehigh
Wilkesbarre Coal Co., 199 Pa. 515, 1901. This was a suit to
recover for personal injuries resulting from a concussion of air
caused by an explosion of dynamite, which was stored in small
quantities to meet current needs, in a small wooden building, in
an open space near the shaft of defendant's mine. When orig-
inally located, the magazine was not in the vicinity of a residence
district, but population had since then settled near it. There
was no negligence on defendant's part and the explosion was
caused by lightning. Binding instructions were given for the
defendant. Held, no error, since negligence was not proved.
In justification of this ruling the court said, "Such materials are
always dangerous, but as their rise is essential to the work of
mining, it is impossible to protect, absolutely, persons or property
in the immediate vicinity."
TENiMxssEE. Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan 213, 1851. A
powder house, located in a populous part of a city, and contain-
ing stored therein large quantities of gunpowder, is per se a
nuisance. The owner was held liable for injuries to plaintiff's
building, caused by an explosion resulting from a stroke of
lightning.
UNITED STATxs. Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 58 Fed. lep.
152, 1893. The maintenance of a magazine containing a large
quantity of powder within the city limits, in violation of a city
ordinance, is a nuisance, which will render the owner liable for
any injury baused to strangers by an explosion from whatever
cause, including lightning.
VERmoNT. Sabin v. Vermont Central R. R. Co., 25 Vt. 363,
1853. Held, that the damages occasioned by laying out and
making a railroad, which commissioners are bound to estimate,
include injuries which are done by railroad corporations to land
adjoining the line of their road, by blasting, in a proper man-
ner, a ledge of rocks, through which-the railroad passes.
WA.SMNGTo. Klepsch v. Donald, 4 Wash. 436, 1892. Where
blasting in a certain locality is not unlawful, i. e., not so near to
other buildings as to obviously put them in danger and hence
to become a nuisance, the fact that a man was killed by a rock
thrown by the blast 940 feet in a horizontal direction, constitutes
only prima facie proof of negligence, which may be rebufted by
showing due care on the part of those discharging the blast, and
the question of negligence under such circumstances cannot be
taken from the jury.
On re-trial, a second appeal was taken on this point and de-
cided in accordance with the first decision. 8 Wash. 162, 1894.
Also decided that such presumption of negligence is not rebutted
by proof that the employes managing the blasting were com-
petent and careful men, and had received strict instructions to
be careful.
WEST VIMG A. Wilson v. Phoeniz Powder Mfg. Co., 40 W.
Va. 413, 1895. Held, a mill manufacturing powder and other
explosives, and storing the same on the premises, situate on the
bank of the Ohio River and near two railroads and a public road,
is a public nuisance, and anyone injured in property by explosion
of powder stored there may recover damages without proof of
negligence in its operation. If the mill were located in a secluded
place, being in itself a lawful business, it would not be a public
nuisance and to recover injury from an explosion plaintiff must
show negligence on defendant's part: Hunt v. Phoenix Powder
Mfg. Co., 40 W. Va. 711, 1895; Watts v. Norfolk & W. By. Co.,
39 W. Va. 196, 1894.
Independent Contractors.-When blasting is done by an inde-
pendent contractor, and the right of a person to recover for
injuries sustained thereby has been determined, it often becomes
a question whether or not "respondeat superior" applies. Where
the work has been let to an independent contractor who has
entire control over the manner of its performance, the owner of
the premises on which the work requiring blasting is being per-
formed is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of
those employed in the work, unless such injuries would neces-
sarily result from the character of the work: Berg v. Parsons,
156 N. Y. 109, 1898; Roemer v. Striker, 142 N. Y. 134, 1894;
French v. Vix, 143 N. Y. 90, 1894; Pack v. New York, 8 N. Y.
222, 1853; Kelly v. New York, 11 N. Y. 432, 1854; Herrington
v. Lansingburgh, 110 -N. Y. 145, 1888; McCafferty v. Spuyton
Duyvil, etc., R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178, 1874; Rdmundson v. Pitts-
burgh, etc., R. Co., 111 Pa. 316, 1885.
But if the contract specifies that the blasting shall be done in
a way in itself negligent, i. e., if the blasting under the circum-
stances amounts to a nuisance and it is done in accordance with
the contract, or if the principal contracts with the knowledge
that the work will be done in a negligent manner or will amount
NOTES. 579
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to a nuisance, then the principal will be liable for injuries result-
ing therefrom even though he retains no control over the work:
Brannoce v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55, 1892; Buddin v. Portunato, 16
Daly, N. Y. 195, 1890; Carman v. Steubenville, etc., By. Co.,
4 Ohio St. 399, 1854.
The Illinois courts have decided, in Joliet v. Harwood
(supra), that blasting being intrinsically dangerous, it is in
itself negligent to contract to have it done in the street; and
the city was held liable for injuries resulting from blasting oper-
ations conducted by an independent contractor, even though
there was no carelessness or unskillfulness in the manner of
performing the work: Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Borough of Nor-
walk, 63 Conn. 495, 1893.
See also Howard v. City of Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 1893,
where an exception was made as to the principal's liability, where
the work contracted for required blasting under dangerous cir-
cumstances.. The city was engaged in constructing a public
school-house. The plaintiff was injured by a blast while walking
on the public highway. The court said that even if under the
contract the contractor was its servant in such a sense that ordi-
narily it might be responsible for his acts, still, from the nature
of the work, the contractor was on the same footing as an inde-
pendent contractor. The reason given was that the service in
which the city was engaged was purely for the benefit of the
public, and, even though the contract required work in itself
dangerous t. the public, the city was exempt for the contractor's
negligence: Deane v. Randolph, 132 Mass. 475, 1882; cuff V.
Newark & New York B. R. Co. et al., 6 Vroom, N. J. 17, 1870.
H.W.L.
